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Sense of moving 
 
Moving closer to the movement 
Mark Schram Christensen and Thor Grünbaum 
Introduction 
This chapter is about the relationship between active movement and the sense of agency (SoA). We present 
two ideas. The first idea concerns the sense of active movement. Without much argument, we will assume 
that there exists a sense of “movement activity” that arises, for instance, when I actively lift my index finger 
from the table: A minimal feeling of physical activity, in this case, a feeling of bodily activity involved in lifting 
the index finger. This sense is usually supposed to be part of SoA. The second idea is about the standard 
experimental paradigms used to study SoA. The purpose of the chapter is to determine whether the already 
existing paradigms can be used to study the sense of movement activity, i.e. the part of SoA related to actual 
movement. The bulk of the chapter is an argument to the effect that standard paradigms are ill equipped to 
study the sense of movement activity. Standard paradigms target the attribution of agency for the 
consequences of active movement rather than the sense of movement itself. These paradigms nearly always 
confound the sense of movement activity and the active prediction of the consequences of the movement. 
In this chapter, we proceed as follows. We start by motivating the assumption of a sense of movement 
activity. We proceed to discuss ways in which this sense of movement is related to SoA and present an 
overview of dominant theories of SoA in contemporary cognitive neuroscience. This will not be an exhaustive 
systematic review of available theories and definitions of SoA; rather, we aim to describe the theories of SoA 
in the context of our overall question: What aspects of the action are studied in studies of SoA? The 
subsequent section describes the types of experimental paradigms that have been used in the study of SoA. 
In particular, we aim to understand what part of the movement, from preparation to delayed action effects, 
has been studied using these typical paradigms. We end the chapter with a brief evaluation of whether all 
relevant aspects of the movements are included in the studies of SoA, or whether further or different kinds 
of studies are needed in order to directly address the sense of movement activity. 
A sense of movement activity 
According to prevailing cognitive theories of movement control, one essential aspect of movements is SoA – 
that is, the sense of being in control of one’s own movements, i.e. being the agent of one’s movements. We are 
supposed to have this SoA most of the time (Haggard & Chambon, 2012), and it provides us with an ability to 
distinguish our own movements from other’s movements (see e.g. David, 2012; Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998). 
Based on this idea of SoA, a number of interesting proposals can be made in terms of the types of 
behaviours and experiences participants would display in various experimental studies, for instance, illusory 
sensations of having made a voluntary movement. We will present some of the ideas concerning SoA and 
assess the extent to which current experimental approaches are able to address the types of behaviour and 
experiences in question. In particular, we will address one particular aspect of SoA studies, namely, the 
relation between SoA and real movements, on one hand, and SoA and transformed consequences of 
movements, such as visual representations of a movement as a dot on a computer screen, on the other hand. 
Based on these considerations, we hope to demonstrate that most studies of SoA are actually not studying 
sense of control of movements, but rather sense of control of transformed consequences of movements. This 
suggests that further studies are needed to address the sense of control of real movements, and that these 
studies may in fact lead to a revision of the current theories of SoA. 
In this chapter, we assume that there is a special sense of activity associated with the performance of 
particular movements (rather than distal consequences of movements). When I place my hand on the table 
in front of me and lift my index finger, I have a clear experience of moving my finger upwards. From the use 
of such simple thought-examples, it seems intuitively appealing that there is a sense of activity directly related 
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to one’s bodily movement. The extent to which this experience is clear or not may depend on the amount of 
attention paid to the movements, however, we will assume such an experience of moving exists and that it is 
tightly coupled to the SoA. 
Furthermore, a body of experimental literature suggests that there is a distinct type of experience related 
to the movement. These studies have either used direct electrical cortical stimulation during surgery 
(Desmurget et al., 2009; Fried et al., 1991) or indirect cortical stimulation (Amassian, Cracco, & Maccabee, 
1989; Christensen et al., 2010) using transcranial magnetic stimulations (TMS). These experiments indicate 
that participants experience a sensation of movement or urge to move directly related to the movement 
rather than a delayed or transformed sensory representation of the movement. 
Based on these considerations, we aim to explore studies that are related to the SoA of movements and 
determine the extent to which contemporary experimental studies enable us to understand the relationship 
between SoA (more broadly conceived) and sense of movement activity. 
Definitions and models of SoA 
Assuming that there is such a thing as a sense of movement activity, the next question becomes how do 
various frameworks conceive of and explain this phenomenon? Thus, before moving on to our central 
problem of experimental paradigms, we want to take a closer look at how the phenomenon is conceptualized 
and explained by prevailing definitions and models of SoA. 
Definitions of SoA 
SoA can be defined along various dimensions. Here we focus on two. The first dimension concerns the extent 
to which action consequences are included in the definition of SoA, whereas the second is a functional 
dimension concerning the degree to which SoA is conceived of as a particular cognitive ability. In Figure 4.1, 
we have sketched these two dimensions along perpendicular axes. 
The first dimension of variation important for definitions of SoA in the present context concerns the scope 
of action and SoA. SoA can be given either a narrow definition, focusing exclusively on the movements, or a 
broad definition, including also the consequences of one’s movement. The narrowness or broadness of the 
definition seems to depend on how one would single out an action. According to the narrow approach, the 
action is more or less the agent’s voluntary movement, whereas according to the broad approach, the agent’s 
action is often thought to include the foreseen effects of the movement in the environment. On the narrow 
definition of action, SoA could be conceived of in terms of Libet-like urges to move and kinaesthetic sensations 
of movement (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983; see also Farrer, Franck, Georgieff et al., 2003, p. 324, 
“When we act, we normally feel ourselves causing and controlling our own action”, and De Vignemont & 
Fourneret, 2004). On the broader definition of SoA, the SoA is not related only to the movement but equally 
to the planned consequences of the movement. Proponents of this broader definition would conceive of SoA 
not only in terms of intentions or urges to move but equally in terms of predicted or planned consequences, 
that is, prediction of sensory events such as switching on the light or causing a sound when hitting a drum. 
The broad conception of SoA is probably dominant in contemporary cognitive neuroscience. To give the 
reader a flavour of the many different and sometimes inconsistent broad descriptions of SoA, consider the 
following quotes. Tsakiris, Prabhu, and Haggard defined SoA as: “Agency is the sense of intending and executing 
actions, including the feeling of controlling one’s own body movements, and, through them, events in the external 
environment” (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006, p. 424). This definition is not only about experiencing 
oneself as the agent of the action but rather about the experience of (1) intending an action, (2) executing an 
action, (3) controlling one’s body, and the experience that (4) the body produces events in the environment. 
According to Tsakiris’ definition, it is, however, not entirely clear whether all four aspects of a movement need 
to be present in order to experience SoA. Nevertheless, it might provide us with a good description of the 
various aspects of an action, which may give rise to a SoA. A similar inclusion of action consequences is also 
present in a definition offered by Balconi and Crivelli. According to them, SoA is the sense that “I am the one 
who is causing or generating an action or thought and all related effects, differently to the sense that I am the 
one undergoing an experience, defined as sense of ownership” (Balconi & Crivelli, 2009, p. 182). 
Taking a more analytic line, Pacherie argues: “The sense of agency for a given action; i.e. the sense the agent 
has that he or she is the author of that action, can, I shall argue, be analyzed as a compound of more basic 
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experiences. Most prominent among these component experiences are the experience of intentional causation, 
the sense of initiation and the sense of control” (Pacherie, 2007, p. 2). Thereby, Pacherie suggests that SoA is a 
complex experiential whole with more primitive experiences as parts. 
In contrast to Pacherie’s more direct focus on the phenomenology, a more mechanistic definition of SoA is 
due to Patrick Haggard (2005). According to Haggard, SoA arises in the integration of efference copy signals 
(von Holst & Mittelsteadt, 1950) (copies of motor command signals, see also subsection Comparator model) 
with predicted feedback and sensory information. This definition is based on the proposals by Frith, 
Blakemore, and Wolpert (2000). When there is no discrepancy between the two, SoA arises. In a 2008 review, 
Patrick Haggard (2008) extends the notion of SoA into various levels of representation: On top, there is a self-
representation level, which gives rise to an experience of Self as Agent; this level rests upon an action-
representation level, where the experience is a “Sense of voluntary control: ‘I did that’”. This level again rests 
upon so-called binding processes, including prediction and reconstructive inference, which then again rests 
upon a level of conscious experiences of intention, action, and outcome, where each of these is governed by 
neural events of motor preparation, movement, and sensory effects, respectively. 
The second dimension of variation important for definitions of SoA in the present context concerns 
conception of SoA as a particular cognitive function or ability. On the one hand, we have researchers who 
conceive of SoA as a primitive ability for self-other discrimination, and, on the other hand, we have 
researchers who think of SoA as simply a primitive phenomenal feeling (“we have a definite background 
feeling or buzz of being in control”, Kühn, Brass, & Haggard, 2013, p. 1936). Focusing on the first side, one 
important motivation for studying SoA has been the proposed relation between SoA and the agent’s ability 
to make self-identification judgements. One important hypothesis has been the idea that this ability to 
identify oneself rests upon the ability to assign the correct agent to an action (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998; 
Jeannerod, 2006). The idea here is that an agent’s ability to identify her own body should be understood in 
terms of an ability to distinguish between one’s own body and the body of some other person. Consequently, 
a large field of research has evolved that deals with the distinction between self and other in correctly 
ascribing agents to actions. 
This second dimension differs in many ways from the first. For one thing, the two extremes (specific ability 
vs. phenomenal feel) are not two opposite end points of a common continuum. It is perhaps better to describe 
them as the two sides of a fundamental metaphysical and methodological choice. Either we conceive 
consciousness in functional terms as something that enables a cognitive ability or we conceive of 
consciousness as a primitive phenomenal state. That theories of consciousness are in fact confronted with 
this fundamental choice is apparent from recent debates about visual consciousness (Block, 2011; Cohen & 
Dennett, 2011; Cohen, Dennett, & Kanwisher, 2016; Kouider, De Gardelle, Sackur, & Dupoux, 2010; Lamme, 
2010) and the more general controversy between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness 
(Block, 1995; Dehaene, 2014). It is a version of this fundamental choice that also confronts researchers in the 
domain of motor control. 
In the present context, the definition of SoA as an ability for self-other discrimination is not without 
problems. If the SoA is fundamentally a question of self-other discrimination, then, given that SoA is thought 
to be pervasive and the ability to distinguish between different agents thereby thought to be fundamentally 
related to control of movement, we should expect that this type of discrimination task makes sense to 
participants in a large variety of situations. This is by no means obvious. When I lift my index finger from the 
surface of the table without others being present, it is not obvious that I am performing a kind of self-other 
discrimination task. Despite the fact that issues concerning self-identification are an important factor 
motivating many studies of SoA, it is not obvious that it always (or even often) makes sense for the 
participants in the relevant types of agency experiments to engage in self-other discrimination tasks. In any 
case, in order to study SoA by studying the self-other distinction, one is faced with the requirement of 
presenting situations in which the self-other distinction becomes important for the participant; otherwise, 
the study of SoA becomes a study of an artificial construct that does not make sense to participants. 
Therefore, one may ask whether the self-other distinction is an important and necessary distinction to 
make during all types of movement. The issue can be articulated in terms of two conflicting positions 
concerning the nature and role of SoA in control of movements. The first position characterises SoA in terms 
of self-identification and operationalises it in terms of the ability to discriminate between self and others. 
According to this position, experiments performed in the domain of SoA assume that self-other 
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discrimination tasks are a valid way to study voluntary movements and their associated agency experiences. 
The second position does not characterise SoA in terms of self-identification. Consequently, according to this 
position, typically, SoA should not be operationalised in terms of self-other discrimination tasks. 
The two dimensions can combine. Both the ability conception and the simple phenomenal conception of 
SoA come in narrow and broad versions. For the remainder of this chapter, we will set aside the conception 
of SoA as the ability for self-other discrimination. The focus in this chapter is the sense of movement activity, 
and it seems unlikely that the majority of possible paradigms for investigating this sensation of movement 
would be paradigms where it makes sense for the participants to make self-other discriminations. In the next 
section, we will argue that prevailing explanatory models differ with respect to which notion (narrow or 
broad) SoA they employ. Finally, we will argue that current experimental paradigms are unable to study SoA 
in the narrow sense, for which reason these paradigms in many cases will be incapable of distinguishing 
between different models. 
Models of SoA 
In this section, we will briefly review some of the most influential theoretical considerations that have 
informed studies of agency the last 15–20 years. We will not make in-depth descriptions of the various studies 
supporting each of the different theoretical approaches to SoA but give a quick overview and point to some 
important differences and similarities (for a more detailed presentation, see the chapter by Jensen, Dong, 
Vinding, and Overgaard, Present volume). 
A number of theoretical models have been proposed to explain SoA. One branch includes low-level basic 
sensorimotor models derived from the efference copy motor literature, which originally focused on the 
execution of movements, but in the context of SoA has been extended to include sensory consequences of 
movements outside the body. In other words, this type of model seems best suited to explain SoA in a narrow 
sense but has often been applied to SoA in the broad sense (see Figure 4.1 for an outline of the difference 
between SoA in a narrow and a broad sense). Another branch includes Daniel Wegener-style models, which 
deal with the sensory consequences of movement. Furthermore, hybrid models such as the cue integration 
model combines the two previous models, and finally, Bayesian integration models, which can be considered 
higher-order models, are trying to explain several different phenomena and different levels of description 
using one explanatory mechanism. 
Comparator model 
The probably most influential model of sense of agency has been the comparator model proposed among 
others by Frith et al. (2000). The idea with the comparator model is that any voluntary movement is produced 
by motor command signals and that these signals are accompanied by efference copy signals (Sperry, 1950; 
von Holst & Mittelsteadt, 1950), which are used to make a prediction of the sensory consequences of the 
movement, using a so-called forward model. The outcome of the forward model is the predicted sensory 
feedback caused by a given movement. The predicted sensory consequences are made available to a 
comparator module. This part of the mechanism carries out a comparison between the predicted and actual 
feedback caused by the actual movement. When the comparison reveals that the predicted sensory feedback 
matches the actual sensory feedback, sense of agency arises. When there is a discrepancy between the 
predicted and actual sensory feedback, one has a diminished or no sense of agency. The comparator model 
has also been denoted the central monitoring theory (see Jeannerod, 2006). As we will see in the next 
sections, although this model was originally tied to the motor system, it has been applied to the prediction of 
other kinds of sensory consequences as well. 
Apparent mental causation 
Another kind of comparison model is the “theory of apparent mental causation” proposed by Wegner (2002). 
According to Wegner’s theory, the experience of wilfully being able to control one’s actions is an illusion. The 
idea is that: “People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought as the cause of their action” 
(Wegner, 2002, p. 64). The claim is that a nonconscious psychological event is the common cause of, on the 
one hand, an action and, on the other hand, a conscious representation. If the conscious representation occurs 
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prior to the action, the subject will experience it as the cause of the action. This model has been almost 
exclusively used to explain judgements of agency for distal effects of action. It was not intended as an 
explanation of the sense of movement activity or narrow SoA. We therefore leave this model aside. 
Cue integration model 
Another influential model that has been proposed to account not only for data in favour of the comparator 
model but equally Daniel Wegner’s postdictive theory of apparent mental causation is the cue integration 
model (Synofzik & Vosgerau, 2012; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). According to this model, a cue 
integration mechanism is fed information from the sensorimotor system, background information about the 
environment, background beliefs, and sensory information. Although sometimes not explicitly 
acknowledged, the cue integration model borrows from Bayesian statistics by using priors in the formation 
of predictive mechanisms, which are part of the model. The integration of all of this information gives rise to 
a SoA in the broad sense. The narrow SoA related to the execution of movements is explained in terms of a 
comparator mechanism. Thus, with respect to a narrow SoA, there is no relevant difference between the 
comparator model and the cue integration model of SoA. 
Active inference model 
The final model we will describe is the active inference model of agency proposed by Karl Friston (see Friston, 
Samothrakis, & Montague, 2012; Friston et al., 2013), which is part of a general theory of free energy 
minimization as a principle for all brain processes (Friston, Kilner, & Harrison, 2006). In the active inference 
formulation of motor control, signals from the motor cortex to the spinal cord are considered as 
proprioceptive predictions rather than motor command signals (Adams, Shipp, & Friston, 2013). The active 
inference idea builds upon the predictive coding framework, in which perception is considered an active 
process that is based on an individual’s predicted causes of the received sensory signals. These predictions 
rest upon prior knowledge mixed with the sensory signals in a Bayesian fashion in order to give rise to 
perception. Active inference is a natural consequence of this particular line of thinking, where perception can 
change either by changing one’s prior belief or by sampling the environment differently through actions. 
According to the active inference definition of agency, SoA is a probabilistic representation of a state that 
represents the consequences of action. This may sound very much like the output from the forward model in 
the comparator model approach to SoA, but it precludes the comparator element between the predicted 
consequences of the movement and the actual movement. This also provides studies of agency with an 
interesting aspect, according to which an agent does not need to evaluate the actual sensory consequences of 
a movement in order to experience (a sense of) agency. This model seems equally suited to the explanation 
of SoA in a narrow and broad sense. 
Discussion of models 
The various definitions of SoA and theoretical models describing SoA reveal many important differences. 
First, it is evident that some researchers seem to think the distinction between self and other is the main 
function of a SoA, and this distinction is reflected in the theoretical approach to SoA. The comparator model 
is often proposed as a framework for the mechanism enabling self-other discrimination and SoA. The 
framework of the comparator model builds upon the motor control principles of efference copies (von Holst 
& Mittelsteadt, 1950). The idea of the concept of an efference copy has been experimentally confirmed in 
animals such as the electric fish (Bell, 1981) and crickets (Poulet & Hedwig, 2006). The hypothesis is that 
efference copies serve the purpose of cancelling out the sensory consequences of the organism’s own 
movements. This central cancellation makes it possible for these animals to sense stimuli as coming from 
outside the organism. The mechanism has also been shown to exist in humans (see section on sensory 
attenuation). 
For the overall purpose of this chapter, the comparator is very appealing because it deals with signals 
closely related to the actual movement. However, contemporary studies of SoA usually adopt a broad 
conception and go well beyond the movements in the application of the comparator model. The model is often 
extended to account also for external consequences of movements. An intriguing aspect of the comparator 
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model when looked upon from an experimental design point of view is the extent to which the findings can 
truly be related to a comparison between predicted and actual sensory feedback. Under many experimental 
settings where manipulations are made of external sensory consequences of a movement, it is often argued 
that, for instance, changes in brain activity are due to differences when predicted consequences are compared 
with the actual consequences. But given the experimental situations, one is left with a question of whether 
the comparison is really made between the predicted and actual sensory feedback or whether it is rather a 
comparison between sensory feedback from different sensory modalities that do not match each other, for 
instance, with respect to evaluation of a movement’s end goal. 
The broader definition of SoA as involving predictions of sensory consequences in the external 
environment requires knowledge of events outside the body and may or may not also require completely 
different underlying mechanisms. This is a challenge in particular if one adopts a strict definition of the 
forward model as using efference copies to generate a prediction of the sensory consequences of the 
movement. According to such a framework, the agent predicts sensory consequences of her movement on 
the basis of signals only from the efference copy (computed from the motor commands that, say, lift the arm). 
Using only the forward model, the agent should be able to determine whether a movement, let us say lifting 
an arm, will lead to an additional button press and a resulting auditory event. It is not difficult to imagine a 
situation where predictions generated only by this mechanism would be impossible or wildly unreliable, in 
particular where, for instance, electronic circuits introduce delays when turning on the lights after pressing 
a contact. Generally speaking, it is hard to believe that our motor system should be the primary source of our 
knowledge of statistical correlations or co-occurrences in the world. In order to produce precise and reliable 
predictions of the consequences of her actions, the agent would need to draw on more general background 
knowledge of the world. 
This way of arguing suggests that the forward model requires additional information in order to compute 
the sensory consequences of the movement beyond the interoceptive feedback it may cause. These additional 
pieces of information require accurate knowledge of external factors contributing to the external 
consequences of the movement. When using the comparator model approach, one assumes that the 
formation of a forward model about external sensory events is constructed exactly as the forward model of 
the internal sensory events. Along the same line of argument, one must also assume that the comparison 
between predicted and sensory consequences must take place at each level of processing in order to construct 
the SoA (when there is no discrepancy between predicted and actual sensory consequences). This 
hierarchical forward model approach has to our knowledge not been studied experimentally in relation to 
SoA (but see Pacherie, 2007), but the underlying neuronal circuitry responsible for such a hierarchical 
approach to forward models has been proposed by Ramnani (2006) to exist in circuits connecting the 
cerebellum with different fronto-motor areas of the cerebral cortex. 
Within the cue integration framework, the problem of determining different levels of hierarchically nested 
comparator mechanisms has more or less been eliminated by the construction of a model that tries to 
incorporate information from many different sensory modalities as well as from other sources of knowledge. 
The model does not explain SoA (in the broad sense) as the exclusive comparator interplay between predicted 
and actual feedback but conceives of the SoA as appearing from the integration between many types of 
information, sensory as well as contextual information and prior knowledge. The basic sensorimotor 
comparator has a distinct role in producing a low-level feeling of agency (that is, SoA in a narrow sense), 
which serves as input to a more general model producing the agent’s judgement of agency (that is, SoA in a 
broad sense). One way to interpret this cue integration framework would then be that the forward model and 
comparator module produces a low-level feeling of agency for the movement, whereas the more general 
model integrating background knowledge produces judgements of agency for external events. The cue 
integration model thus avoids the problems that beset the comparator model in explaining the comparator 
processes involved in the evaluation of external consequences of movements. However, as already indicated, 
with respect to a narrow notion of SoA, the two models are identical and thus make identical experimental 
predictions. 
According to the active inference model, a common mechanism accounts for both sensation and movement. 
The model works on the principle of one mechanism that accounts for all aspects of the movement and the 
sensations. The parsimony of the approach makes it appealing to use as an explanation of underlying 
mechanisms of SoA. However, this sweeping generality is also a cause for concern. When one mechanism 
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explains all these phenomena, one might worry that the model provides little insight into the important 
particulars. If we were looking for neural correlates of SoA of this general mechanism, it would be difficult to 
avoid the conclusion that all structures and interactions behaving according to an active inference mechanism 
were related to SoA. 
Summing up, in terms of mechanisms that may give rise to a SoA, there are proposals, as described 
previously, suggesting that comparator mechanisms may give rise to SoA (in narrow and broad senses). 
According to the cue integration model, motor commands, predictions, and sensory signals are combined 
with contextual information and all of it contributes to the SoA (broad sense). Finally, we also have the active 
inference model with its caveats described in the previous section, which does not leave any part of the brain 
untouched in relation to being part of a mechanism that could produce SoA (narrow and broad sense). One 
common property of all these models with respect to narrow SoA is that they explain the sense of activity 
narrowly related to movement in terms of interplay between predicted and actual proprioceptive feedback. 
This commonality makes it clear that we can imagine an alternative explanation. 
One possible alternative explanation for SoA in the narrow sense, absent from the existing literature, is the 
notion that the sense of activity associated with active movement could be directly produced by motor signals. 
In other words, an alternative explanation of the sense of movement activity might be that the experience is 
directly related to motor commands. The information carried by motor signals might somehow be accessible 
to the agent and drive the agent’s judgements about her motor activity (in the absence of other kinds of 
information). This alternative explanation can thus be contrasted with the various models discussed in this 
section according to which the narrow SoA should be explained in terms of the interplay between predicted 
and actual sensory feedback. As the next section will show, existing experimental approaches to the study of 
SoA tell us very little about the sense of movement activity and cannot be used to distinguish between the 
two types of explanatory models (narrow SoA as the outcome of motor commands vs. the outcome of the 
comparison between predicted and actual sensory feedback). 
[Insert Figure 4.1 Here] 
 
Figure 4.1 Sense of movement activity placed in context of narrow and broad SoA. The dot indicates the time of movement 
onset. We assume that there exists some kind of sense of movement activity temporally located around the time of the execution 
of the movement. According to a narrow view of SoA, SoA deals with processes internal to the agent, whereas the broad SoA 
also incorporates external sensory consequences of the movement. The narrow and broad SoA can be considered as different 
foci within an overall phenomenal feel dimension. On the other hand, SoA has been considered a question of making self-other 
distinction, which can be considered a judgement made along an ability dimension. 
Experimental approaches to the study of SoA 
In this section, we will give a rough overview of the experimental approaches that have been employed in the 
studies of agency carried out over the last 50–60 years. The purpose of the section is to determine whether 
the already existing paradigms can accommodate a narrow perspective on SoA, according to which a sense of 
movement activity is directly related to the actual movement. 
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In terms of experimental paradigms, there are broadly speaking three types of experiments. First, 
manipulations of the ongoing sensory feedback signal (typically visual), which are by far the most popular 
method to manipulate SoA. Second, studies of action-effect associations, in which the SoA is evaluated 
according to whether the participants feel that they produced some sensory consequence. Third, sensory 
attenuation experiments, where the sensory consequences of a movement are diminished when the 
movement is voluntarily performed. 
Manipulation of feedback 
Visual distortions 
By far, the most important branch of SoA studies has been experiments in which the feedback generated by 
an action is manipulated in some way. Probably the most famous example of this is the alien hand experiment, 
designed by Nielsen (1963). Participants placed their hand inside a box and could view their hand through a 
slit. The participants were asked to draw straight lines on a piece of paper placed inside the box. 
Unbeknownst to the participants, the view of their hand was sometimes replaced by a mirror view of the 
experimenter’s hand. In the situations where the experimenter starts to make line drawings that deviate from 
the drawings made by the participant, the participants apparently no longer experience that they made 
movements voluntarily. In post-experimental interviews inquiring into participants’ experiences of SoA (or 
some similar construct), participants were asked to give a description of their experience. 
These experiments have been replicated in numerous other studies using modern computer technology. 
Fourneret and Jeannerod (1998) performed an experiment in which participants drew lines on a digitizing 
tablet with angular distortions of varying degrees up to 10° introduced by a computer algorithm. In one set 
of experiments, participants were asked to make a similarity judgement between their own motor 
performance and predefined lines. Ritterband-Rosenbaum et al. (2011; Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Christensen, 
& Nielsen, 2012; Ritterband-Rosenbaum, Karabanov, Christensen, & Nielsen, 2014; Ritterband-Rosenbaum, 
Nielsen, & Christensen, 2014) used a similar design where participants moved a cursor using a tablet from a 
starting point to different target positions with visual deviations. Participants were asked to indicate whether 
the movement they saw on the screen was made by themselves or the computer. 
Other types of distortions have also been employed, such as the bimanual in-phase anti-phase hand 
opening and closing used by Fink et al. (1999), where the visual feedback sometimes was distorted using a 
mirror, so participants sometimes performed anti-phase left and right hand opening and closing but viewed 
in-phase left and right hand opening and closing due to the presence of the mirror. Farrer, Franck, Georgieff 
et al. (2003) performed an experiment in which participants controlled a virtual hand that was either in 
accordance with their own movement, rotated 25° or 50°, or controlled by an experimenter. Balslev, Nielsen, 
Paulson, and Law (2005; Balslev, Nielsen, Lund, Law, & Paulson, 2006) performed visuo-proprioceptive 
conflicts while participants performed mouse movements on a screen. The viewed movement of the cursor 
was either in accordance with their actual movement or a recording of a previous movement they had 
performed themselves. Others have used more advanced methods such as virtual gloves to turn real 
movements into computer representations (Nahab et al., 2011). In these experiments, anything from 
evaluating the strangeness of movement (Fink et al., 1999), reporting whether the displayed movement is 
their own, a distorted version of their own movement, or someone else’s movement (Farrer, Franck, Georgieff 
et al., 2003), or using 0–100 point scales of sense of control was employed to evaluate the subjective 
experience of the movement (Nahab et al., 2011). 
Temporal visual disturbances 
Another type of visual disturbance is the use of temporal delays, for instance, Leube, Knoblich, Erb, and 
Kircher (2003; see also Leube, Knoblich, Erb, Grodd et al., 2003) used hand opening and closing. Visual 
feedback of that movement with pseudo-randomized delays between 40ms and 200ms was used. 
Participants had to evaluate whether or not they experienced a delay. MacDonald and Paus (2003) also used 
delayed visual feedback of hand movement using a virtual avatar hand that was controlled by a glove. 
Participants performed voluntary or passive hand movements and were asked whether the image of the 
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delayed moving hand that they viewed was their own or someone else’s, i.e. a self-other discrimination task. 
In addition, TMS was applied over the parietal or temporal cortex to interfere with the discrimination task. 
Shimada, Hiraki, and Oda (2005) used delays of passive movement displayed visually to the participants. The 
participants had to judge whether the feedback was delayed. 
Combined temporal and spatial visual disturbances 
A combination of temporal and spatial visual disturbances was employed by Farrer, Bouchereau, Jeannerod, 
and Franck (2008). In this study, participants were asked to perform joystick movements and view the 
movements on a screen. The entire time they viewed their own hand but were asked to evaluate whether it 
was (1) their own movement, (2) a modified version of their own movement, or (3) someone else’s 
movement. The experiment used varying spatial disturbances with respect to spatial angle from 0–110° and 
delays from 0 to 1,300ms. Interestingly, the spatial and temporal disturbances gave rise to very different 
response patterns. With small deviations (angular and temporal), the participants judged that they 
themselves were shown on the screen. For intermediate spatial deviations, they reported that the feedback 
was modified, and for large spatial disturbances, they reported that someone else’s movement was shown. 
For temporal disturbances, the participant did not ascribe the movement with long delays to someone else, 
but simply as modified. So, in conclusion, spatial and temporal deviations have very different effects when 
you have to evaluate between self, biased, or other. The study is framed in terms of the comparator model, 
and the authors speculate that the two different types of deviations influence goal representation of the action 
differently. The study highlights two very important aspects of SoA studies. First, the type of deviation matters 
as to how participants evaluate the movements they are presented with, and second, the types of choices the 
participants can choose between impact the interpretation of the study. 
Action-effect studies 
Another type of experiment used to study SoA is what could be described as action-effect studies. The general 
design of these experiments is such that participants perform an action, and this action leads to a 
consequence or an effect. An example could be the experiment performed by Elsner and Aschersleben (2003) 
where a ring attached to a box can be pulled or pushed, and the box can either produce a tone or switch on a 
light. In this experiment, the effect depends on the action, and a typical manipulation could be to reverse the 
consequence (tone or light) of the action (push or pull). 
By manipulating the outcome of an action, Sato and Yasuda (2005) induced SoA using a simple button press 
experiment, where participants at their own pace freely pressed two buttons using their left or right index 
finger. The button press was followed by one of two tones either immediately or after a delay. In a congruent 
task, the tone following button presses was always the same; in the incongruent task, the tones did not 
necessarily follow the same button press. Participants had to evaluate on a scale from 0 to 100 whether they 
agreed with “I was the one who produced the tone” and “I was the one who was listening to the tone”. The 
introduction of the incongruent task diminished SoA. 
Farrer, Valentin, and Hupé (2013) used a button press experiment where a delay between the button press 
and a subsequent movement of a ball was introduced. Participants could evaluate the action effect by judging 
that either they had full control over triggering the ball, they had partial control over triggering the ball, or 
that a computer controlled triggering the ball. In this study (Farrer et al., 2013), the long delay condition gave 
rise to “other” responses. This is in contrast to the study from 2008, where the long delay conditions did not 
give rise to “other” responses. So, the response profile for the “delayed effects” in the study from 2013 
resemble the response profile of those that are “visually distorted” from the 2008 study. Interestingly, this 
discrepancy for delayed responses is not discussed, only that a gradual SoA measurement seems more 
relevant than a dichotic measure of SoA. 
Intentional binding 
One of the most influential series of studies on implicit measures of SoA is on intentional binding (Haggard, 
Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002). The intentional binding experiment derives from the famous Libet clock 
experiment (Libet et al., 1983), where participants are watching a rotating clock. At their own will, 
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participants perform an action and indicate what the time of the rotating clock was when they performed the 
action or when they intended (felt the urge) to perform the action. In the variant studied by Haggard et al. 
(2002), participants again had to perform an action (a button press), and the button press caused an auditory 
tone to follow 250ms later. Now participants had to perform a temporal judgement (using the rotating Libet 
clock) of when they performed the action or when they heard the tone. These judgements were compared 
with control situations where participants either had to perform an action without a tone or listen to tones 
alone, and then judge when the action took place or when the tone was played. In comparison to the control 
situations, actions that preceded tones were on average judged to be formed later and the tones that followed 
the actions were judged to be played earlier. This apparent experience of temporal attraction of the action 
and the effect has been called the intentional binding effect because it only appears when the action is 
voluntarily produced. When the action was produced by a transcranial magnetic stimulation (Haggard et al., 
2002) over the motor cortex, the temporal attraction of the action and effect was not observed. 
The temporal binding phenomenon was suggested as an implicit measure of SoA (Haggard et al., 2002) and 
has been used in many subsequent studies as an objective measure of SoA. One of the interesting derived 
results of the intentional binding experiment has been the introduction of various statistical relationships 
between actions and their effects. For instance, movements were perceived later when it was more likely that 
they were followed by an event, and if it was less likely that the movement was followed by an event, it was 
perceived earlier (Engbert & Wohlschläger, 2007; Wolpe, Haggard, Siebner, & Rowe, 2013). On this basis, it 
has been concluded that the contingencies determine the experience of actions (Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & 
Haggard, 2009). For a comprehensive review of the intentional binding literature, the reader should consult 
the study by Moore and Obhi (2012). In addition, Wolpe and Rowe (2014) discuss various ways to address 
objective measures of agency based on the intentional binding procedures. 
Sensory attenuation 
One of the underlying reasons for suggesting the idea of internal models in the central nervous system was 
the principle of sensory attenuation, which is the ability to diminish the sensory effect when one is the cause 
of the sensory effect, and, in particular, the ability to discriminate between externally generated sensory 
events and the sensory events one as an organism has produced. To explain this discriminative ability, von 
Holst and Mittelsteadt (1950) posited the existence of efference copy signals. The effect of sensory 
attenuation has also been identified in humans when the electroencephalography (EEG) responses to 
voluntarily generated tones were compared with externally generated tones (Schäfer & Marcus, 1973), 
showing a reduced EEG amplitude of auditory evoked potentials when the tones were generated by oneself. 
This has very recently been studied in relation to SoA, where Timm, Schönwiesner, Schröger, and SanMiguel 
(2016) found that the N1 component of an auditory evoked response potential was not related to SoA but the 
P2 component was. The sensory attenuation phenomenon has also been shown in other contexts in humans 
such as tickling sensations (Blakemore, Wolpert, & Frith, 2000) and force escalation (Shergill, Bays, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 2003). 
It is worth noticing that the existence of efference copies was suggested because animals were no longer 
able to suppress the effect on sensory organs caused by their own movements when the sensory organs were 
manipulated through surgery. They ended up being unable to adjust their movements appropriately to the 
environment based on the actual sensory feedback, not because they lacked the sensory feedback, but 
because their predictions about the sensory consequences of their movements were wrong following the 
surgery of the sensory organs. This explanatory purpose of the internal models suggests that one cannot 
really use sensory attenuation paradigms in order to determine whether other types of mechanisms than the 
comparator may be involved in SoA. A further problem with the use of sensory attenuation as an experimental 
paradigm in studying SoA is the fact that sensory attenuation is supposed to be the effect of a mechanism for 
cancelling out signals or at least for dampening them down. This makes it difficult to understand how the 
paradigm could be used to study the mechanism that is supposed to give rise to a positive SoA signal. If the 
SoA mechanism is supposed to function in such a way that the better the match between prediction and actual 
sensory feedback, the stronger the signal for agency (the stronger the SoA), then this SoA mechanism does 
not have the properties of a sensory attenuation mechanism, according to which the better the match, the 
more the signal is dampened down. 
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Discussion of experimental approaches to SoA studies 
It is clear that most of the previously mentioned studies employ an experimental approach where a 
movement, usually a button press, elicits some kind of external event such as a tone or something that moves 
on a screen. In some cases, this event resembles a delayed version of the actual movement performed using 
a delayed video signal. However, none of the presented studies addresses the narrow SoA of actual movement 
without external consequence. What is evident from our review is the lack of SoA studies of the movement 
itself. All existing studies (as far as we know) examine movements and their external consequences – except 
of course for some sensory attenuation studies, which for the reasons discussed previously should be rejected 
as an appropriate way to study the sense of movement activity. 
So why is there a lack of SoA experiments that directly address the sensations related to agency of the actual 
movement itself? Our proposal is that one important reason is the definitions of SoA available in the 
contemporary literature – in particular, the broad definition of SoA and the definition of SoA in terms of self-
other discrimination. Many researchers have adopted a broad definition of SoA as the sensation of being the 
author of an action and its consequences. If one has defined SoA in relation to action consequences, one might 
not be motivated to dissociate the “agency” of a movement from agency of an action and its consequences. 
As our discussion of definitions of SoA demonstrated, many researchers understand SoA as an inquiry into 
whether an action is produced by oneself or another agent. If we accept that agents are separated by their 
outer boundaries (Friston, 2013), it would seem there would be no reason for thinking that movement 
“within these boundaries” could ever be mistaken with movements of another agent. If we think SoA plays an 
important role in self-other discrimination, then external sensory events would seem the appropriate 
domain. 
Broad definitions of SoA are probably part of the explanation for the near total dominance of action-
consequence paradigms. A narrow definition of SoA in terms of the sense of movement activity does not fit 
so easily with the experimental focus on action effects. Let us end this section by flagging a possible 
complementary and much more practical explanation. A final suggestion as to why there are no SoA 
experiments that address the actual movements may be that it is simply very difficult to manipulate the 
proprioceptive feedback while performing a movement. 
Concluding remarks 
Summing up the argument thus far, there are reasons for assuming that agents of bodily actions experience a 
sense of activity in relation to their physical movement. A brief review of the various definitions of SoA 
demonstrated that this sense of movement activity often is acknowledged as part of a more global SoA. The 
global or broad conception of SoA includes the action in preparatory, movement, and environmental 
consequence stages. 
We subsequently reviewed some of the dominant theoretical models of SoA. These models differ along a 
number of different dimensions. One dimension is how well equipped a model is to explain motor control 
and the sense of activity associated with the execution of particular movements. Some version of the 
comparator model is perhaps the model best placed to account for motor control. We argued that the 
comparator model is faced with two problems. First, the comparator model is too often called upon to explain 
the SoA for events (e.g. environmental sensory consequences) that a comparator model strictu sensu could 
not explain on its own. Second, the original motivation for postulating a comparator mechanism in motor 
control was to explain sensory attenuation. If the comparator mechanism is a mechanism dampening down 
the sensation of self-produced proprioceptive and tactile signals, then it does not seem to be a good candidate 
for explaining the sense of movement activity. We made the simple suggestion that the sense of movement 
activity is associated directly with motor command signals. It is an open question if any of the dominant 
theoretical models is consistent with this suggestion. 
Finally, we reviewed standard paradigms used to study the SoA. The upshot of this review is that even if we 
had the theoretical models to explain the sense of movement activity, we do not have the paradigms. The 
review shows us that either the paradigms target the SoA for action consequences or, if they actually do 
directly study bodily sensations, they concern sensory attenuation. At present, we do not have paradigms to 
isolate the sense of movement activity from the SoA for environmental events. We do not have paradigms that 
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could help us distinguish between the various theoretical models of the sense of movement activity. A major 
task for future studies of SoA is therefore to develop new experimental paradigms.i 
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